Exclusion and Influence: The Battle Over the Pacific Islands Forum
Events at the upcoming Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) cast a revealing light on China’s expanding reach in the South Pacific—and the mounting challenges for democracies like Taiwan. Just days after the Solomon Islands excluded Taiwan and several major dialogue partners from the forum, Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung issued a stinging rebuke, labeling China a “regional troublemaker” bent on suppressing Taiwan’s voice and shaping the region to its will.
This isn’t simple diplomatic posturing. For years, the Pacific Islands Forum has served as the preeminent gathering of Pacific leaders, a collaborative venue fostering economic development, climate action, and security partnerships. Traditionally, inclusion of “dialogue partners”—such as the U.S., China, Japan, and Taiwan—signaled a regional commitment to openness. That dynamic shifted notably this year as the Solomon Islands, widely seen as falling under Beijing’s sway after switching its diplomatic allegiance from Taipei to Beijing in 2019, abruptly barred Taiwan and even the U.S. from participating as observers. Only those nations with embassies—China and the U.S.—maintain backdoor avenues for informal lobbying; Taiwan, with no such embassy, is shut out entirely.
A closer look reveals this is no isolated episode. As Lin Chia-lung stresses, “the exclusion is not just a snub to Taiwan, but a loss for Pacific nations that have benefited from Taipei’s development aid, public health programs, and climate resilience projects.” Underpinning the dispute is a struggle between the so-called “Pacific Way”—a philosophy of consensus-building and inclusiveness—and Beijing’s efforts to define who gets a seat at the table.
According to the Lowy Institute, China has quadrupled its aid and loan commitments across the Pacific in the past decade, often tying economic support to demands for political loyalty. By pressing forum hosts to block Taiwan, Beijing sends a clear message: align with us, or risk losing access to funding and infrastructure. Professor Anna Powles, a Pacific regional security expert at Massey University, warned in a 2023 briefing that “restricting which partners Pacific leaders can engage with upsets the delicate balance of regional autonomy and pushes the region closer to great power competition.”
Taiwan’s Defiant Resolve and the “Emperor’s New Clothes”
Capitalizing on global attentions drawn to the forum, Lin Chia-lung did not mince words. Rejecting China’s regular invocation of United Nations Resolution 2758—which recognizes the People’s Republic of China as “the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations”—Lin reminded reporters: the resolution doesn’t even mention Taiwan. Taiwan has never been ruled by the PRC, he insisted; it is Beijing’s narrative, not international law, that erases Taiwan’s sovereignty.
These aren’t unsubstantiated claims. According to a Brookings Institution analysis, the UN resolution’s original intent focused purely on governments’ representation, not the sovereignty of territories. Yet Beijing has masterfully used this ambiguity, pressuring organizations, governments, and even event organizers to treat Taiwan as an internal Chinese province rather than a country with its own governing institutions, elections, and global partnerships. The result: a slow-motion international erasure that advocates such as Lin now loudly contest.
Taiwan’s response is telling. Even after the latest rebuff in the Solomon Islands, the government vows to continue its work in the region “through alternative channels.” Experts note that this kind of soft power matters. “Taiwan has long filled vital service gaps—public health, disaster response, and education—that Beijing’s grand promises often ignore or delay,” said Dr. Graeme Smith, a Pacific affairs scholar at Australian National University.
“If you’re a community leader in the Pacific, the absence of Taiwan means the abrupt disappearance of scholarships, mobile medical teams, and genuine development dialogue.”
— Dr. Graeme Smith, Australian National University
Ulterior motives, however, can outmaneuver altruism. China’s focus on infrastructure and market access comes with more overt forms of leverage—think port expansions and resource extraction deals that echo 20th-century spheres of influence more than 21st-century partnership. In this climate, Taiwan’s transparent, people-first programs stand in stark contrast, shining a spotlight on the costs of exclusion not just for Taipei, but for local communities.
America’s Strategic Calculus and the New “Trump Route” Experiment
The drama in the Pacific isn’t unfolding in isolation. Across Eurasia, a new round of geopolitical maneuvering is further complicating China’s calculations and exposing rifts in global alignments. The U.S.-brokered Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) in the South Caucasus, granting exclusive development rights to the U.S. in a crucial cross-border corridor for 99 years, signals Washington’s eagerness to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The corridor directly bypasses both Russia and Iran, stitching together supply chains through countries that are increasingly wary of Chinese and Russian patronage.
By integrating into the “Middle Corridor”—a rapidly growing trade route between Europe and Asia—TRIPP risks provoking both Moscow and Beijing, but it also offers an alternative for countries squeezed between larger powers. According to Reuters, if the initiative takes off, it could become a model for American diplomatic leverage and a pluralistic antidote to China’s state-driven influence model. Strategic analyst Eka Khorbaladze has argued that the more routes and partnerships open to small and medium-sized nations, “the less coercion and dependency we see—the very nightmare Beijing fears.”
For Washington, however, reinforcing alliances is complicated by a fundamental problem: while China solidifies its hold over vassal-like states (notably, Russia, post-Ukraine invasion), the United States hesitates to fully commit to bold new paradigms. Policymakers remain wary of both a collapsing Russia (which could trigger regional chaos and give China more room) and a revitalized Moscow entirely in Beijing’s camp. As Harvard historian Odd Arne Westad has noted, “U.S. leaders are stuck between managing decline and competing ideals—uncertain whether confrontation, containment, or selective engagement will produce a more stable order.”
Peel back the layers of these interrelated power plays, and you’re left with a fundamental question: who will define the rules for commerce, diplomacy, and security in regions where global interests collide? The decisions made in Pacific capitals and Eurasian corridors will ripple far beyond their borders—challenging illusions of zero-sum rivalry and fueling new experiments in collective, inclusive engagement.
Progressive voices warn that abandoning smaller partners or bowing to authoritarian gatekeeping will not only stifle democracy but also create a leadership vacuum—one Beijing is happy to fill. That’s a lesson with resonance for Taiwan, Pacific islanders, and democratic allies everywhere: the battle isn’t just about status or recognition. It’s about building a world where dignity, openness, and shared prosperity outweigh the fleeting gains of transactional power politics.
